Orbán, Gábor 1866: Am Ende war Königgrätz

Tactics and Strategy in the Prussian-Austrian War.
The scholarly examination of the 'causes' of the Austrian defeat in 1866 is as old as the war against rising Prussia itself. Already immediately after the war, the search for the reasons of the failures was eagerly pursued. At that time, it was believed that the fault lay in the wrong decisions of the army leadership and especially in the person of the commander-in-chief of the Imperial and Royal Northern Army, Feldzeugmeister Ludwig Ludwig. Northern Army, Feldzeugmeister Ludwig von Benedek. This one-sided explanation and the debate about the so-called 'question of guilt' were later seen in a more differentiated way. In the 20th century, the background to the defeat was sought on a political level on the one hand and on a military level on the other, with both aspects being closely intertwined. Even today, the main objects of investigation in the military perspective are the development of weapons technology, the (strategic) operational mistakes made during the campaign and the shortcomings of the Imperial and Royal Army as a result of the drastic austerity policy. Army as a result of the drastic austerity policy. Little attention, however, is paid to tactical behaviour on the battlefield. In 1866, Austria went to war against Prussia with a tactic that was almost 60 years old and based on an overestimation of the historical tradition of military values.

This volume takes a close look at precisely this aspect. In the context of armed conflicts since the revolutionary and coalition wars against France, Austrian military doctrine, especially tactics, is presented and systematically analysed. In doing so, this treatise critically examines the backward recruitment as well as training system of the time and does not leave topics such as uniforming and equipment, everyday life of soldiers or communication untouched. However, the focus of the study is firstly on the use of firearms, which the Austrians despised, and secondly on the unshakeable belief in the invincibility of their own closed combat formations. A special role was attributed to the bayonet attack. Furthermore, the interaction of the different types of weapons in the war is shown and the complex interrelationships of strategic and tactical ideas are pointed out. It becomes apparent that the Imperial and Royal Austrian Army was one of the last 'Napoleonic' forces of all, and with its admirably courageous but hopelessly outdated fighting style was on lost ground in the industrial age.