Megargee, G. Hitler und die Generäle

The struggle for leadership of the Wehrmacht 1933-1945. The leadership structure of the German Wehrmacht was "even more nonsensical than the best general staff officers could invent if they were given the task of inventing the most nonsensical war top division." This was said in 1941 by a young Major i. G. His name was Stauffenberg. What he meant by this is now shown by the American historian Geoffrey P. Megargee. He presents the first modern, critical overall account of the history of the leadership of the Wehrmacht.
The scenes of this history were primarily the High Command of the Army and the High Command of the Wehrmacht. The main actors were Hitler and the highest generalship, especially the army leadership. Megargee sheds new light on all sides. In a differentiated way, he examines structures and power relations as well as the people who made the military decisions of the Third Reich, and he shows how fundamental shortcomings and mistakes in the highest command positions destroyed the initial operational and tactical advantages of the Wehrmacht. An extraordinarily illustrative example of this is provided in the chapter on the day-to-day operations in OKH and OKW during the winter crisis before Moscow in the week of 15-21 December 1941.
Megargee destroys once and for all the myth that Hitler, Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht since 1938 and Commander-in-Chief of the Army since 1941, started the war single-handedly, so to speak, and then lost it all on his own through his mistakes, and that conversely, if he had only listened to his generals, everything would have turned out quite differently - a myth that they themselves carefully cultivated. Single illustrations. 348 pages.