The concept of strategic assault of a Nations industrial and military base by air was heralded by Britain as far back as the immediate period before the start of WWI. However, stringent post-War economy ensured that the creation of Bomber Command in 1936 witnessed a daunting disparity between the aim of striking at an adversarys ability to sustain itself on the Field of Battle and the means to do so. The initial three years of WWII left the Command very weak in both human and material terms. The navigational means with which to accurately guide the bombers to targets was almost completely lacking during this period, while the enemy defensive network inflicted serious casualty rates. The punishment handed out was accordingly minimal in effect. The resurgence of the Commands fortunes coincided with the appointment of Sir Arthur Harris as C-in-C. The advent of the more efficient Lancaster and Halifax designs ensured a greatly increased bomb tonnage could be delivered. Electronic aids such as "Gee", "Oboe" and "H2S" ensured the task of locating targets was simplified. So it was that by 1944/45 the Third Reichs industrial base was virtually rendered impotent.
In the first three years of the Second World War, Bomber Command was very weak in terms of both personnel and equipment. The means of navigation with which the bombers could be guided precisely to the targets were almost completely lacking during this period, while the enemy defence network claimed large numbers of victims. The effect of the attacks carried out was correspondingly low. The upswing in Bomber Command coincided with the appointment of Sir Arthur Harris as Chief of the General Staff. The introduction of the more powerful "Lancaster" and "Halifax" bombers ensured that a significantly higher bomb tonnage could be transported. Electronic aids such as "Gee", "Oboe" and "H2'S" ensured that target localisation was simplified. In this way, the industrial base of the Third Reich was practically incapacitated in 1944/45.
