Stachelbeck, Christian Wissen und Krieg

Taktisches Lernen des deutschen Heeres 1888–1926

It is a settled matter in contemporary research that organizations such as the military "learn." However, the way in which such learning processes unfolded during times of war and peace remains largely unexplored. In this study, Christian Stachelbeck examines the German Army as a learning organization between 1888 and 1926. The central focus is the process of organizational learningspecifically the acquisition, preservation, transfer, and application of tactical knowledge for warfare. The study investigates tactical learning within the German Army across three phases: preparations for the First World War, the conflict itself (19141918), and the immediate post-war analysis conducted by the Reichswehr up to 1926. Proceeding from the thesis that the German Armys learning behavior followed an evolutionary path characterized by compromise, the author traces the development of a specific "lessons learned" system regarding tactics and the structuring of tactical training and professional development for officers. Drawing on an extensive range of sources and considering the implementation of *Auftragstaktik* (mission-type tactics), the author provides fresh and illuminating insights into military learning processes. His findings undermine previous, overly one-sided interpretations regarding the German Army's capacity for learning; the German Army was neither an organization resistant to learning nor a highly adept "Genius of War" (Trevor M. Dupuy).