Bahnemann, Jörg A. Parlamentsarmee?

Bundeswehr braucht Führung

The Federal Republic of Germany came into being four years after the Second World War. It was another seven years before the new state began deploying the Bundeswehr; the majority of the population was against it. The Bundeswehr was therefore presented as a supplement to the NATO troops, as an entry ticket to the alliance that promised security against the communist threat. The political class was not interested in the soldiers; it renounced the definition of national security interests. With the help of Wehrmacht officers, the young troops managed to set up the agreed formations in record time; their vigour was repeatedly curbed by cumbersome bureaucracy and a largely disinterested political leadership. Examples from the stages of the career of an officer of the first hour illustrate how the inadequately clarified relationship between political and military leadership repeatedly created problems that often demanded excessive effort and sacrifice from the soldiers. Their contribution to the victory over the aggressive Warsaw Pact was little recognised. The loyalty of the soldiers was not reciprocated, the primacy of politics was and is practised as a dangerous one-way street. Ongoing committees of enquiry, decisions about inadequate equipment and parliamentary lip service cannot justify the term parliamentary army.