Querengässer, Alexander El Alamein 1942. Materialschlacht in Nordafrika

Alexander Querengässer's book corrects some widespread ideas about the war in North Africa. Whereas the Germans had hitherto been able to impose a mobile warfare on their opponents, the British 8th Army at El Alamein had succeeded in bringing Rommel's advance to a halt, consolidating the front and later counterattacking with great material superiority. Alexander Querengässer considers the events commonly referred to as the First and Second Battles of El Alamein in their context. He sheds light on the conditions and concrete circumstances of the confrontation in the context of the war situation and points out the particularities of the history of operations. But the immediate consequences for the course of the war are also discussed. A separate chapter is devoted to the survival of the battle in the memory cultures of the former war opponents.

The battle of El Alamein in autumn 1942 ended the victorious march of the "desert fox" Erwin Rommel and with it any hope the Axis powers had of gaining possession of the Suez Canal. The British war effort had thus been dealt a decisive blow. While the popular image of the desert war is still dominated by the idea of lightning-like advances by German tanks, El Alamein was more a battle of material and attrition. The Axis powers were outgunned from the start.