Colvin, Tony The Noise of Battle. The British Army and the Last Breakthrough Battle West of the Rhine, February-March 1945

Half of The Noise of Battle is a detailed description of three battles that took place between 27 February and 2 March 1945 over four days in the Rhineland south of Goch, mainly in the words of those involved. The fighting took place between the 3rd Division, supported by the 6th Guards Armoured Brigade, and the 8th Parachute Division. For the first time, the combined actions of more than 50,000 men over 96 hours have been analysed from the ground up to provide an unprecedented understanding of a significant military event. The 3 Scots Guards said of Winnekendonk: It is believed that this is certainly one of the best small tank/infantry battles ever fought and that it deserves closer examination. The fighting was bloody and heroic, and some controversial aspects are explained for the first time. The other half of the book consists of an analysis of the units and individuals involved from the two divisions and the tank and air forces supporting them. An answer is given to the question of why Army Group 21 was only able to advance slowly and at great cost just two months before the end of hostilities. The answer emerges from the analysis and is verified by a comparison with the contemporary Canadian Operation Blockbuster and with two battles on the Hitler Line. Evidence is provided that the recent claims that Montgomery's generalship was efficient and saved lives are unfounded. Instead, it is shown that the military hierarchy, including Churchill, ignored the operational methodology developed by Sir John Monash under unified command that led to victory in 1918. In World War II, however, the Royal Armoured Corps and the 2 TAF were never integrated with the infantry and artillery and were never adequately equipped because they were bound to the cult of mobility. General Elles demanded that the infantry tank should be immune to all German anti-tank guns, and his Matilda II was an important reason for the liberation of Dunkirk and the success of Operation Compass in North Africa. Compared to the Hundred Days of 1918, the author argues that the British forces in 1945 were less efficient in every respect, with the exception of the killing of German civilians through carpet bombing. The thoroughly documented and researched conclusions of this book offer a new and controversial interpretation of Army Group 21.