McCarty, Philip Point of Failure

British Brigadiers in France and Norway 1940

This is an innovative study that examines whether or how a select group of British Army officers - brigadiers - survived two immediate strategic defeats due to their pre-war social, professional and military backgrounds and went on to serve and rise - or not. By the early summer of 1940, the British Army had suffered two simultaneous strategic defeats in Europe - in France and Belgium from May to June and in Norway from April to May. "Point of Failure" focuses on a particular group of British Army officers, Brigadier Generals, who served there. In 1940, when the rank of Brigadier General existed, it was more of a holding post for an officer who temporarily held a post to fulfil a task. Afterwards, he either returned to the rank of colonel or was promoted to major general. Therefore, brigadier generals were in a sense the "middle management" of the army - on the way up or without further progress. "Point of Failure" aims to examine this group of officers and see if their career survival and/or advancement after 1940 was influenced by factors prevalent before 1940. Factors that may have contributed to the promotion of officers before 1940 will be addressed, be they professional, social or operational factors. Consideration is also given to those that are thought to have contributed, but which are shown in this book to be either ineffective or less influential than previous assumptions arising from the literature on the British Army in the Second World War, such as the influence of patronage by senior officers, notably Bernard Montgomery and Alan Brooke. "Point of Failure" naturally relies heavily on secondary sources such as campaign reports, biographies and biographical sources. Primary sources such as war diaries, personal notes and autobiographies are used but are subject to limitations. The most important primary source, which would be extremely revealing on a personal level, namely the confidential annual reports of officers throughout their careers, remains closed and inaccessible to researchers. In order to examine whether the factors discussed in this book prevailed or changed as a result of over three years of fighting, a later chapter will compare the officers who served in combatant commands on D-Day and in the early stages of the Battle of Normandy in 1944 with their 1940 counterparts.