Marquis, Christopher G. U.S. Mercenaries and the Legion of Condor

Airpower in the Spanish Civil War

This is the story of the air force in the Spanish Civil War from the perspective of three important American figures: Colonel Stephen Fuqua, military attaché to the Republican government of Spain; Captain Townsend Griffiss, deputy military attaché for the air force; and former US Navy pilot Frank Tinker, who flew as a mercenary for the Spanish government. Based on his analysis of the experiences and writings of these three individuals, author Christopher Marquis examines the lessons that the conflict revealed about the use of air power in war. The book first places the Spanish Civil War in the larger context of the early development of the US Air Force, then discusses the course of the war, focusing on important air operations and technological advances. Marquis begins with the early history of the American Air Force during the First World War and the institutional development of the US Army Air Service and the US Army Air Corps. He also covers the development of early air force theories, particularly the idea of strategic bombing, in which civilian, industrial and political targets were bombed in order to bring the war to a swift end. The narrative then shifts to Spain in July 1936 and follows the course of the Civil War, focusing on air operations. Significant events covered in detail include the airlift of Nationalist troops from Morocco to Spain, defensive air defence missions over Madrid, the incendiary bombing of Guernica, the destruction of the Iron Ring of fortifications around Bilbao, the bombing of Barcelona, and finally the air superiority achieved by the Nationalist Air Force and its allies. US observers witnessed the intervention of the German Luftwaffe in the conflict, as well as the air forces of Italy, France and the Soviet Union. Marquis concludes that the Spanish Civil War proved that air power is a crucial element of modern warfare. He also points out that American air force leaders were reluctant to acknowledge the lessons of the war, as they did not conclusively prove the effectiveness of strategic bombing. Despite this reluctance, the subsequent measures taken by the US to expand its aircraft fleet before the Second World War reflected some of the lessons learned from the air war in Spain.