Bamford, Andrew British Amphibious Warfare 1739-1815

Success and Failure Across Five Continents

Volume 157 of the series From Reason to Revolution 1721-1815. Throughout the long 18th century, Great Britain carried out numerous amphibious operations, ranging from raids to the landing of entire armies. British Amphibious Warfare 17391815 provides case studies of some of these operations and examines why their outcomes ranged from great successes to severe disasters, without any obvious long-term learning curve. Many of the mistakes made at Cartagena in 1741 were repeated at Walcheren in 1809, exposing soldiers in both campaigns to a slow death from fever. Between these two events, we find successes such as Louisbourg (twice), Quebec, Belleisle, and Charleston, as well as the textbook landings at Aboukir Bay in 1801 that brought Abercromby's army to Egypt, but also failures at Lorient, St. Cast, Ostend, New Orleans, and elsewhere. What factors ensured that some expeditions were successful while others failed? What lessons were learned, and why were they not consistently applied afterwards? British Amphibious Warfare 1739-1815, based on contributions to the 2023 conference From Reason to Revolution, but also includes additional contributions and materials, provides an overview of Britain's amphibious operations from the early 18th century to the end of the Napoleonic era, an examination of Thomas More Molyneux's earliest attempts to develop an amphibious doctrine, and a series of case studies examining both successes and failures. Case studies include: Cartagena 1741, Louisbourg 1745, Lorient 1746, Belleisle 1761, the Delaware River 1777, Charleston 1780, Ceylon 17951796, Aboukir Bay 1801, Walcheren 1809, and amphibious raids in the Adriatic during the Napoleonic Wars.