Campbell, David/Noon, Steve US Soldier vs Afrikakorps Soldier. Tunesia 1943

From Sidi Bou Zid to El Guettar, this fully illustrated study pits the U.S. Army against the best that the Axis forces in Africa had to offer. Operation "Torch", launched on November 8, 1942, landed Anglo-American forces in Vichy-controlled Morocco and Algeria to create a second front against the Axis forces in North Africa, catching Rommel's German and Italian forces in the claws of a giant pincer. The Axis forces in North Africa were powerfully well armored and equipped, but fresh to war, and it showed. Organization suffered from a surfeit of peacetime theories and training was insufficient and ill-applied. Despite such failings the US GIs and their commanders learned very quickly, adapting to German tactics and the realities of mechanized warfare. The Afrikakorps was seasoned by years of fighting against increasingly powerful British and Commonwealth forces, and was led by one of the Reich's most capable generals. The German doctrine of mechanized warfare had proved itself time and again, but ever-growing logistical and supply problems were blunting its effectiveness.

. The American units in North Africa were well equipped, including a large number of armoured vehicles, but relatively inexperienced, as was soon to become apparent. The organisation suffered from an excess of peacetime theories, and training was inadequate and poorly applied. Despite these weaknesses, the U.S. soldiers and their commanders quickly learned to adapt to German tactics and the realities of mechanised warfare. The Afrika Korps was steeled by years of fighting against increasingly strong British and Commonwealth forces and was led by one of the German Empire's most capable commanders. The German doctrine of mechanised warfare had proved its worth time and again, but the ever-increasing logistical difficulties and supply problems considerably weakened its effectiveness.