Shamiev, Kiril Imperfect Equilibrium

Civil–Military Relations in Russian Defense Policymaking

Despite years of attempts to improve its military capabilities, Russias full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 revealed a crippling lack of skill, discipline and equipment. Non-material factors, in particular the power struggle between military and civilian leaderships, have hindered reform of its armed forces: with officers dominating defense policy, the Kremlin has struggled to implement the necessary changes.

Kirill Shamiev explores the political reasons behind Russias poor military preparedness for the war in Ukraine. He demonstrates how a seemingly obedient military has frequently blocked civilian reforms, taking advantage of weak oversight mechanisms. The Kremlins efforts to centralise control and make the armed forces personally accountable to President Vladimir Putin harmed institutional learning, cementing a conservative civilmilitary status quo. While this protected the military from civil society interference and ensured Putins autocratic rule, it ultimately limited the pace and scope of change.

Analysing three cases of reform between 2000 and 2021, Imperfect Equilibrium offers critical insights into the relationship between civilian control and military effectiveness in Russia. Drawing on extensive qualitative and quantitative evidenceincluding interviews, parliamentary speeches, media reports and surveysit shows how unchecked autonomy can undermine military development, even in authoritarian contexts.

Kirill Shamiev is a political scientist specializing in civilmilitary relations, Russian domestic politics, and defense affairs. He received his PhD from Central European University and, at the time of publication, served as a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University. His scholarship and public commentary have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, CSIS, The Guardian and other leading outlets.