Harrison, Richard (Hrsg.) Battle of the Dnepr

The Red Army's Forcing of the East Wall, September-December 1943

The book describes a decisive phase of the Red Army's advance along the strategic southwestern direction during the major offensive that followed the battles in the Kursk Bulge area in July and August 1943. The Germans, now on the strategic defensive in the east, attempted to retreat and consolidate their front along the Dnieper River. The success of the Red Army in breaking through these expectations in this particularly important section is the subject of this study. It is a composite work based on three studies by the Military History Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, which was tasked with collecting and analyzing war experiences. The first is a comprehensive internal document from 1946, which was finally published in Russia in 2007, albeit with numerous additions in the form of comments and other information not included in the original. The present work omits these additions and instead provides its own comments where necessary. Two short articles from another publication round off the collection. The book is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the efforts of the Voronezh Front (later renamed the First Ukrainian Front) under General N. F. Vatutin to capitalize on the Soviet victory in the Battle of Kursk and carry the war to the Dnieper and beyond. This included pursuing the retreating Germans and attempting to capture the crossings over the Dnieper in the Kiev area before the Germans could cross them and consolidate their position. Although they succeeded in capturing several small bridgeheads, the Soviets were initially unable to develop them into operationally significant bridgeheads. By shifting their efforts to the bridgehead north of Kiev, the Soviets finally managed to break out and capture Kiev, although a German counterattack from the Zhytomyr area set them back somewhat. Nevertheless, by the end of the year, the Red Army in this area was ready to resume the offensive to recapture the right bank of Ukraine. The two articles that make up the second part deal with the combat operations of the Steppe Front (later renamed the Second Ukrainian Front) under General I. S. Konev through Poltava and Kremenchug, as well as the crossing of the Dnieper and the capture of bridgeheads south of Kiev. This is a rather narrowly focused tactical-operational study dealing with the efforts of the front's 37th and 52nd Armies to expand their positions on the right bank of Ukraine into operational bridgeheads that could support a larger offensive to the west in 1944.