Herspring, Dale R. The Kremlin and the High Command. Presidential Impact on the Russian Military from Gorbachev to Putin

Throughout its existence, the Red Army was seen as a formidable threat. By the end of the Cold War, however, it had become the weakest link in the Soviet Union's power structure. The military, which had always been subordinate to the Communist Party, suddenly found itself subordinate to the president of a democratic state in 1991. Dale Herspring examines exactly how this relationship affected the viability of the military in the new Russian Federation. Herspring's book is the first to assess the relationship between the Russian military and the political leadership under Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. He portrays an outdated and demoralised military force still struggling to free itself from the paradigms of the Cold War, while failing to cope not only with debacles in Afghanistan and Chechnya, but also with the rise of crime and corruption within its own ranks. He reveals how Gorbachev neglected the military to save Russia from internal collapse and how Yeltsin failed to honour his continued promises of support. And while Putin claims to understand the armed forces better, he has greatly tightened his control over the military while overseeing its modernisation efforts. Herspring argues that the president's leadership role - or significant lack thereof - has been the determining variable in what kind of military Russia sends into the field. It is up to the president to ensure that the high command successfully adapts to the new policy - otherwise combat readiness will decline and generals and admirals could become politicised. By focusing on how the high command has responded to the decisions and leadership style of each president, Herspring shows that despite the continuing importance of the military's bureaucratic structure, personal factors play a much more important role than in the past. The book offers the most comprehensive analysis to date of the influence of the Russian president on the Russian officer corps, the soldiers he led, and the combat readiness of the army. It sheds light on the chaos that has afflicted the USSR and Russia over the past 25 years and shows how the often strained relationship between the president and the high command must evolve if the Russian Federation is to become a truly democratic nation.