Munoz, Antinio J. Hitler's Luftwaffe Infantry

The German Air Force Field Divisions, 1942-1945

In the spring of 1942, Hitler's troops suffered heavy losses on the Eastern Front. To compensate for these losses, the army demanded the transfer of 20,000 men from the navy and 200,000 airmen from the Luftwaffe, who were to be retrained as infantrymen. Reich Marshal Hermann Göring, head of the Luftwaffe, vehemently opposed this plan, fearing that it would weaken his political power after several failures by the Luftwaffe. He suggested instead that the Luftwaffe should train and equip these 200,000 men, as their National Socialist spirit would benefit the war effort. Hitler, who valued political loyalty over military logic, approved the formation of the Luftwaffe field divisions. Although unsuitable for frontline combat, these divisions were deployed in all theatres of war except North Africa. They were generally ineffective, with many considered fit only for garrison duty. On the Eastern Front, they had a difficult time due to the brutal intensity of the fighting. However, two divisions, the 12th and 21st, performed relatively well. This in-depth study examines the Luftwaffe field divisions and reveals the tragic consequences of Göring's decision. Many members of the Luftwaffe lost their lives in these poorly prepared divisions, lives that could have been saved if they had received adequate training from the army. The investigation is based on extensive archival material and highlights the human cost of this strategic error.