Saunders, Tim The Salamanca Campaign

After a gap of two years, the 1812 Salamanca Campaign saw Wellington taking the offensive in Spain against Marshal Marmonts Army of Portugal. Marching from the border fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo which fell to the Allies in January, neither commander was willing to take the risk of a general action without a clear tactical advantage. The result were stand-offs as Wellington offered battle on the San Christóbal Heights, but once the small French-garrisoned forts left behind in Salamanca fell, Marmont withdrew to the Douro. For over a week the two armies shared cooling waters of the river before Marmont "humbugged" Wellington and fell on the Allied left flank at Castrejón. Wellington rushed to the aid of the Light and 4th divisions with the heavy cavalry. Over the following days Marmont dexterously maneuvered Wellington back towards Salamanca, with both armies within cannon shot still not risking battle. When it seemed Wellington would have to march back to the safety of Portugal, Marmont finally made a mistake on the plains south of Salamanca on 22 July 1812, by allowing his army to become over extended. Wellington saw what was happening and after weeks of marching and counter marching, the battle the soldiers earnestly hoped for was on. In the past it has been difficult to place the fighting on the ground in the center of the Salamanca battlefield, where "vast clouds of smoke and dust that rolled along the basin" obscured vision even for those fighting. Supplementing their letters, diaries and memoirs with modern geographical aids, archaeology and a stout pair of boots, it is now possible to reconcile the sequence of the battle with locations, in a way in which it was not feasible even a few years ago.

The two armies shared the cool waters of the river for over a week before Marmont "outwitted" Wellington and attacked the Allied left flank at Castrejón. Wellington rushed to the aid of the Light Division and the 4th Division with the heavy cavalry. In the days that followed, Marmont skilfully manoeuvred Wellington back towards Salamanca, with both armies advancing to within cannon shot range and yet not risking a battle. When it looked as if Wellington would have to march back to the safety of Portugal, Marmont made a mistake on 22 July 1812 on the plains south of Salamanca when he allowed his army to over-extend itself. Wellington saw what was happening, and after weeks of marching and counter-marching, the battle that the soldiers had eagerly hoped for was joined. In the past, it was difficult to locate the fighting in the centre of the Salamanca battlefield, where "huge clouds of smoke and dust drifting across the basin" obscured even the fighting men from view. By supplementing their letters, diaries and memories with modern geographical tools, archaeology and a sturdy pair of boots, it is now possible to reconcile the course of the battle with the locations in a way that was not possible just a few years ago.